Societal Approach for Interpersonal Communication and Social Interaction Analyses. Critical Discourse Analyses in Political Practice

ABSTRACT

The article analyzes how hostility is legalized in different societies and which narratives and discourses are used to make the dominant state ideologies acceptable for citizens. The authors use critical discourse analysis methodology to compare the main narratives of (a) the establishment of communism that was dominant in the Soviet Union and (b) the anti-terrorism movement in the first decade of the 21st century, used in the spread of democratic ideology and justification of the actions of different countries. The Cold War rhetoric in the Soviet Union meant the linguistic militarisation of life: war rhetoric interdiscursively invaded everyday life though the language of the media and thus became the language of describing everyday life. After the events of September 11, 2001, a new global confrontation was constructed. During the Soviet Union period we fought against international imperialism; now we fight against international terrorism. Both main narratives, the one of the Soviet Union and the one formulated by George Bush (Jnr), are phrased by the political elite and made legitimate through mass media. Both narratives are characterized by euphemistic use of language, because military activity is justified by the need to defend democratic values.

Keywords: Critical Discourse Analysis; War Discourse; Anti-Terrorism War; Ideology.
INTRODUCTION

The aim of the present article is to show the linguistic and communicative mechanisms of the relationship between citizens and the state, which help to maintain governmental ideological standards, and to observe how these mechanisms alter in the specific societal conditions of the changing world. In this context the article studies how military activity is made legitimate in different societies as an example of different governmental ideologies of different countries. The article also analyzes which narratives and discourses are used to make the dominant governmental ideologies acceptable to citizens.

The authors use the method of critical discourse analysis to compare the change of the dominant narrative and discourses during the totalitarian Soviet Union period, as well as during the democratic independence period. They observe the main narrative of building communism, which was dominant during the Soviet Union period, as the basic concept of communication between the citizen and the state, and the main narrative of the anti-terrorism movement in the first decade of the 21st century, which was used to spread democratic ideology and justify the activities of different countries.

The research question of the present article lies in the fact that the heads of state, by using rhetorical means and constructive attitudes, manipulate the will and the values of citizens. The actual content of the presented text is concealed as discourse in text that is heard and read, and thus the real content of the message is transformed. This results in the evolution of the so-called "half-true / half-false" syndrome.

The construction of war discourse in different societies is observed, as well as the linguistic choices that help to maintain it, how people are mobilized and how military activity is justified. Estonian society has lived in the linguistic environment of the Cold War military rhetoric; Estonians have participated in military activity in Afghanistan when we belonged to the Soviet Union (1979 – 1982), and also as an independent country as part of NATO. Consequently, Estonia has made a political-ideological transfer from one Cold War era to another, the cold war era of anti-terrorism. The present work analyzes how society, with the help of communication, was mobilized for military activity in the totalitarian Soviet Union and also as an independent democratic country, after the events of September 11, 2001.

The Soviet Union ideology, that became the foundation for all the rhetoric practiced with people everywhere in that country, was developed from the ideologies of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, which within the discourse analysis of the Soviet society have been characterized as one large meta narrative. The discursive changes that followed the annexation of Estonia have been called a cultural revolution for almost half a century. It was certainly a break, but not so much at the level of ideas, because socialism as an ideal was not an unknown ideology for Estonians. According to Rein Ruutsoo (2000: 40), what happened was something more – the common denominator of the bolshevist innovations was a discursive shock not only to the intellectuals but to all society. Estonians had to acquire not a new ideology but first and foremost, the discursive competence of the Stalinist period, and later of the stagnation period, as well as the specific rhetoric that accompanied it and what was subsequently called the ‘deep language’ (Radzhinski 2000; Tampere 2003).

The Cold War rhetoric lost its meaning after the Fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. The new global contradiction was formulated into rhetoric in 2001, after the fall of the twin-towers. Also the anti-terrorism narrative is observed as one of the central narratives in the paper, because it has developed into one of the most powerful global narratives in the new millennium and the world’s field lines are divided by it and military activity is organized according to it. The present paper observes the development of the new war discourse into one of the mainstream discourses mobilizing society.

The discourse of anti-terrorism has become the centre of the political rhetoric of the present century, although the terrorist attacks are more marginal compared to, for instance, the problems of AIDS or organized crime. About 500 million crimes a year are registered on the globe.
and it is believed that their real number is twice as big. At the same time the battle against terrorism has become the main discourse of countries’ foreign policy. According to Markku Kangaspuro (2004), there is a danger that the rhetoric of anti-terrorism enables speakers to hide their real objectives and obscure the real content. Because of that, the deep language, which began in a totalitarian society with the experience of the Soviet Union and was later successfully practiced, has transferred over to the spoken language of democratic societies.

Therefore, the analysis of war discourse presented in the article is important, as is the comparison of how war discourse is used in totalitarian and democratic societies to mobilize people and shape public opinion in order to support war activity. The means are similar in fact, even though the governmental political ideologies are fundamentally different.

CRITICAL LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF TEXTS

According to Michel Foucault (1992/1977: 48-49), every society has its own regime of truth, its own discourses, which are accepted and which are made to function as truthful; there are mechanisms and instances, which allow the separation of true and false slogans; there is status for those who are allowed to say things that function as truthful. The political economy is characterized by five traits. (i) “The truth” has been focused around the form of the discourse and the institutions producing it, (ii) it is subjected to a continuous economical and political pressure, because both economic production, as well as political power, need the truth (iii) it is an object of ‘spreading and consuming’ - it circles in the educational system and communication channels, (iv) it is developed and spread under the influence of large political or economic institutions (university, army, media) and (v) it is re-produced within ideological debates.

Discursive power relations are established in society by different methods. People accept these beliefs (or truths), that seem authoritative to them and are presented through prestigious channels. Therefore, through the media the public is influenced by scholars, experts, professionals, opinion leaders, different social agents. (Teun Van Dijk 1998: 9.)

The study focuses on the analyses of narrative, argumentation and vocabulary in different social practices, in societal context. Discourse, according to Norman Fairclough (1999), is a social behaviour, that appears in language, and by which social reality is created. The reality is interpreted and fixed through words within the process of creation. The analysis of discourse concentrates on the construction of a social reality. The aim of the discourse analysis is to prove general suppositions on natural matters hidden in the language. Through text analysis, discourse analysis tries to find contradictory components, hidden in the text, that are not directly revealed, but still exist.

Fairclough’s (1999) attempt at drawing together language analysis and social theory focuses upon a combination of this more social-theoretical sense of ‘discourse’ with the ‘text-and-interaction’ sense in linguistically-oriented discourse analyses. This concept of discourse analysis is three-dimensional. The discursive ‘event’ is seen as being simultaneously a piece of text, an instance of discursive practice, and an instance of social practice. The ‘text’ dimension attends to language analysis of texts. The ‘discursive practice’ dimension, such as ‘interaction’ in the ‘text-and-interaction’ view of discourse, specifies the nature of processes of text production and interpretation. For example, which types of discourse (including ‘discourses’ in the more social-theoretical sense) are drawn upon and how they are combined. The ‘social practice’ dimension addresses issues of concern in social analysis such as the institutional and organisational circumstances of the discursive event and how this shapes the nature of the discursive practice, and the constitutive/constructive effects of discourse referred to above.

This approach is effective for the analysis of communication in the new social and cultural situation, because much more conservative and traditional combinations of methods are not as exhaustive and do not provide the possibility of seeing social and cultural influences as deeply
and specifically as required by the present authors. Discourse analysis is also a good method for studying ‘deep language’ (Tampere 2003), and the syndrome of ‘lies’, because this technique makes it possible to read ‘between the lines’ of texts and meta-texts.

Discourses and narratives “simplify” (“translate”) economic and political relations. Narratives are discourse-relative i.e. narratives are the “stories” of crisis associated with particular discourses. Which competing discourses (narratives, imaginaries) and which strategies, succeed in establishing themselves depends upon a number of factors:

- “Structural selectivity’s”: structures are more open to some strategies than to others;
- The scope and “reach” of the discourse (narrative);
- The differential capacities and power of the social agents whose strategies are “to get their message across”, e.g. their access to and control over mass media and other channels and networks for diffusion;
- The “resonance” of discourses, their capacity to mobilize people, not only in the institutions but also in the lifeworld. (Fairclough 2005a: 55-56.)

Fairclough’s (2005: 61) interdiscursive analysis is used in the text analysis of the present article. Interdiscursive analysis of text is an analysis of the specific articulations of different discourses and styles that characterize a particular text. It also takes a profoundly relational view of change – for instance, changes in discourses are characteristically not simply the substitutions of one discourse for another, but changes in relations between discourses, a new articulation of discourses, which includes prior discourse.

Fairclough has been active in sociolinguistic research, studying text vocabulary, grammar and semantics. If linguistic analysis is done at the micro level and social analysis at the macro level, then critical discourse analysis grasps both of these.

Firstly, the authors of the present study ask, what dominant narratives and future strategies are used to maintain ideological beliefs and keep people mobilized, in which institutions these narratives are created, how they are developed into dominant discourses through media.

If we analyze the way discourse turns into a dominant strategy, we need to observe the following issues. In which research centres and institutions is the dominant narrative phrased? How and where did these receive a hegemonic status?

Fairclough’s (1992, 1999, 2001, 2005a) analysis structure has been used in the work. Fairclough recommends studying the experiential value included in words:

- Which classification schemes are relied on?
- How does the construction of us/them take place linguistically?
- Are there keywords (which have cultural importance; which have different/changing meanings; which have significant potential)?
- Are there neologisms?
- Are there euphemisms?
- How is the word “democracy” used as a euphemism to legitimize the existing ideology?

Critical discourse analysis is used as a method to study narratives and language use. It is a comparative analysis, which studies the comparison of the main narrative dominating in the Soviet Union and in anti-terrorism activity. The authors of the article rely on different discourse analyses in the context of the societal usage of language; as a result conclusions are partly selective, but at the same time characteristic in relation to contexts.

CONSTRUCTION OF WAR-DISCOURSE IN THE SOVIET UNION

In the Soviet Union, Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism became one of the most influential systems/ideologies of the century, which in studying the discourse, has been characterized as a meta-narrative, which includes the theories of truth and historical progress, and treatments of future (David Horwarth 1995: 118).

When we observe which institutions of the Soviet Union phrase the dominant main discourses and maintain the order of discourse, then
in the Soviet Union the right to change and rephrase ideologically important constructions of thought belonged to the political elite who acted through the system of the communist party and who owned the monopoly of truth. Only the party congress could change the established national standard; in this respect the generally recognized standpoint, that the evolving treatment of society and philosophy which was formulated mainly at the party congress level, was absolutely adequate at the time. The principal task of the communist party congresses during the stagnation period was mainly to ensure that nothing had changed significantly. (Ruutsoo 2000: 29.)

Maarja Lõhmus (1999: 68) claims that the ruling ideology of the Soviet Union included eight principal myths:

- the myth of the October Revolution victory and the new era,
- the myth of the creator Lenin and the party,
- the myth of the uniform family of the Soviet countries as a society without contradictions, which has many enemies “outside”,
- the myth of the Great Patriotic War and the invincibility of the Soviet Union,
- the myth of the development of socialism and the future of communism,
- the myth of the liberated and happy Soviet man,
- the myth of work and the working class as the ruling force,
- the myth of the flourishing of the Soviet economy.

Thus the dominant narrative was related to building communism. All media at that time had to create and support these myths. Creating and upholding the discourse of a successful winner, manipulating texts, editing purposefully and censoring, gave an opportunity to construct reality in the spirit of the dominant ideology.

The order of the discourse was upheld in the following way. Ceremonial party events took place with certain regularity and were broadcast in the media according to a very specific scheme. A regular institutionalized, continuous, signal repeated after short intervals was suitable as news forwarded to media – a specific repeated message. An event had to be chosen that was not specific from the viewpoint of the established ideology, that its interpretation codes were existing. An unexpected event was not an event, no problems of societal organisation and ideology existed. A model example of the ordinary was a working class hero, who at the same time was one of many. (Lõhmus 1999: 74-75.)

The party principle governing journalism was absolute. The party principle was also acknowledged as the underlying principle of activity for all cultural and social institutions (Høyer, Lauk, Vihalem 1993: 177). Considering Marju Lauristin’s and Peeter Vihalem’s research (Vihalem & Lauristin 2001) on media and communications in the Soviet Union, it is possible to say that journalism served public relations and communication management functions in the Soviet Union: there was no free media in communist society. This action was a one-way asymmetrical communication – an ideological, political struggle for an abstract ‘better communist future’. In this process the roots were holy and ideological. After a few years, developments changed the ideology: it separated from Marx’s concept and started to serve the ‘Nomenclature’. (Høyer, Lauk, Vihalem 1993: 176.)

The treatment of communism based on Lenin’s doctrine looked upon journalism as a major part of the political system. To quote a well-known saying by Lenin, journalism had to be and in fact was, ‘Not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, but also a collective organiser’ (V. Lenin, The Tasks of the Soviet Power Next in Turn). Lenin drew a parallel between journalism and the scaffolding around a building; journalism should serve as a means of communication between different groups of the Party and the people, thus fostering joint construction of the edifice of communism. The Russian Bolshevik Party under Lenin’s guidance, and dozens of other communist parties, viewed culture and communication pragmatically, discerning in them a Machiavellian means of gaining power. In its treatment of journalism, Leninist-Communist doctrine rested upon the following logic (Høyer, Lauk, Vihalem 1993: 177):

- history is the struggle between classes
- every person must inevitably take sides with one of the classes in society
- spontaneous movement and the natural evolution of events can only lead to the domination of bourgeois ideology
in order to defeat bourgeois ideology, it is necessary to arouse the workers’ class-consciousness, to organise and discipline them, thus changing them from a class in itself to a class for itself.

The above goals can be realised by the Party that uses journalism for this purpose.

Ideology persisted as an explanatory model of society presented in standard ideological language, which compelled the following the ruling conventions (Ruutsoo 2000: 29). It was text creation that included specific linguistic play. Text had to include certain specific expressions and reflect previously agreed attitudes. Thus a particular tradition emerged that in order to get permission to publish a book, the linguistic “play” and obligatory citations were placed in the introduction.

Text editing meant sticking to the ideological discourse, because it was believed that even the smallest change in this discourse could be dangerous and harmful and give some clue to a potential enemy. Soviet journalism had to keep people passive and in an undefined state, the real imaginary discussion through the media took place with possible ideological enemies, who were taken into consideration more than the local people. (Lõhmus 1999: 79.)

Communist ideology created its own communication style, referred to as ‘deep language’ (Radzinski 2000, Tampere 2003). This refers to a style of utterances, both orally and in written texts. Lenin initiated its use during the revolution. The whole process was clandestine and people were called to violent resistance with sentences such as ‘We hope that it will be a peaceful demonstration’ — in fact, an appeal for a very bloody demonstration. ‘Deep language’ was also systematically developed by Stalin. For example, Stalin’s statement announcing the promotion of a comrade in reality was his/her death sentence. ‘Deep language’ was preserved in the language use of subsequent state leaders in different forms, depending on the activity of the Party and the personality of the leader. Over time it was ingrained in all of society because people understood that it was safer and more beneficial to use the same style as the leaders. This style was characterised by a ‘syndrome of lies’, which meant that in order to understand the actual content of information one had to read ‘between the lines’ and have a critical attitude towards texts. This style was born at the same time as the practice of communist ideology and it was typical of the whole period in many respects. It was one of the instruments of the Communist Party for controlling and influencing people.

According to Daniel Weiss (2005: 255) Soviet propaganda constituted a well-organized, semantic whole which affected the very heart of sentence semantics. As for universal and existential quantifiers, their assignment to their own or another group, respectively, is well justified in a collectivist ideology. The we-group is characterized by total harmony and consensus. It dedicates itself totally to the building of socialism, it unites in the total hatred against the Fascist enemy, it mourns over the loss of its beloved leaders with total sadness etc.

During Stalinism the name of the enemies in Soviet Union were spies, traitors, pests, parasites, spongers, loafers, shirkers, not to speak of the old enemies inherited from the revolution, who were later eliminated in the homeland of socialism, such as capitalists, imperialists, landowners, the clergy, etc. This holds in particular for the most popular ones, e.g. kulak (a wealthy peasant) and vrag naroda (people’s enemy). To these one may add formalist, which specialized in denigrating representatives of art, music and literature. The Soviet enemy was more often not portrayed because he was conceived of as hidden and masked. (Weiss 2005: 264.)

The Post-Stalinist rhetoric became a separate discourse in the Soviet Union: society was mobilized to fight against the enemy, international imperialism. The construction of cultural-linguistic closeness took place under the name of Homeland-discourse, which functioned as an ideological icon of shaping the collective consciousness (Borisov 2009: 125). The Cold War rhetoric was supported by the Soviet Union mass culture, where war films, mainly of World War II, played an important part. The field of sports was also harnessed in front of the ideological propagan-
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The Soviet lifestyle was considered a new man through da carriage and related to defending the homeland and was placed under the rhetorical slogan “ready to work and to protect the homeland”.

One of the main problems of Soviet journalism was the fight with an imaginary enemy. An example of a model text ie. canon (based on L. Brezhnev NLPK XXV congress speech) is the following: “There is no place for neutrality or compromise where two worldviews clash. This demands political alertness, active, operative and convincing propaganda work and timely counter-attack against hostile ideological diversions.” (Lõhmus 1999.)

The signs of power discourse can be seen in the pervasive hinting about war sufferings and achieved victory as a consolidative discourse and construction of the leader cult. The Hungarian disturbances were described as a rebirth of the Fascist fireplace. (Anu Möistlik 88-114.)

Totalitarian systems are characterized by the emergence of the so called new man through new vocabulary. The post-occupational Estonian vocabulary changed significantly. Such new discourse keywords appeared in the language as Soviet Empire, Soviet republic, krai, oblast, city council, district committee, people’s court, security organs, party committee, comsomol, pioneer organisation, assemblyman, active voice of the party. The ideological work and its forms characteristic of the Soviet Union are represented by such words as communism builder, restoration, idealism, revolutionary, self-criticism, party membership, principality, ideological-political, political education, speed meeting, Sunday event, agitation brigade, propaganda work, party education network, political circle, election campaign, October celebration, the turn of June, democratize (Aava, 2003: 113.)

The Soviet lifestyle was considered a new form of societal relations between people. It included such traits as free work, creativity, collectivism, creative independence, power of people, friendship of nations, the Soviet people’s certainty about tomorrow, communist target, of a party, optimism, loyalty to the revolutionary ideals, socialist humanism, Soviet patriotism, internationalism, moral purity (Lõhmus 1999: 70).

The demonstrative will for peace of the Soviet people, demonstratively opposed to the alleged aggressiveness of the capitalist world, was reflected by such words as peace holder, peace fighter, peace event. During the armament race period, these words were used as euphemisms. Words and terms were used with a meaning that had shifted from the original; a phenomenon was often replaced by its antonym. For example, “deterioration of economy” was called “economic development”, “deterioration of national culture” was called “flourishing of national culture”. All totalitarianism produces linguistic play where words mean the opposite: the Soviet Union was called “democratic” and its politics were a “policy of peace”, the country was engaged in active “defensive armament”. The above examples are also characteristic as examples of communication on a deep language principle – new texts and contexts developed together with life and history, into which ideological message was encoded and which in a way fooled the receivers of messages, because reality and constructions within government rhetoric were increasingly difficult to separate (Aava, 2003; Lõhmus, 1999).

Depicting the Soviet man was totally canonized in journalism at that time, because this was one of the foundation myths. Work (for the benefit of communism) was considered to be the most important necessity of life for the Soviet man. Media discourse prescribed relating work to an heroic deed. The hero-theme was important; a hero always fought, either in war for the homeland or with difficulties at the work front. Specific styles developed for depicting the Soviet myths and outlook. For example, the “nobleman” depicted in high style was the worker (fighter), his attribute was hammer (weapon), his environment factory (battlefield) (Lõhmus, 1999: 71). Whereas people are motivated to work for remuneration in a capitalist society, in a totalitarian society, people are motivated to work in the name of heroic fame.

A pervasive topic in the media was the socialist fight, work victories as a specific form of patriotism and construction of democratic elections in the media. Permanent constructions dominated in media texts: the Soviet Union was “the land of victorious socialism and democracy” where “the ruling forces were really national in character”, “true democracy” governed the Soviet Union, and a permanent construction “roaring applause” accompanied the leader cult. (Möistlik, 2007: 83-84).

Stalinist colonial and cultural imperialism didn’t leave any room for Estonian national and cultural identity. The citation-language also ob-
structured such floating markers as freedom, dignity, democracy etc., which usually can also be discursively mobilized under the control of authoritarian regimes (Ruutsoo, 2000: 41).

Based on interdiscursive analysis it can be said that the worldview was constructed in media through the discourse of war and fighting, politicizing and militarizing of everyday life took place, man was depicted through heroic struggle. Thus military vocabulary entered everyday life. The Great Patriotic War victory narrative was revived through rendering work as heroic via keywords and permanent constructions such as: victories at work front, working hero, socialist fight, victory of work, army of workers.

The great bolshevist narrative exhausted itself with perestroika and lost its importance in the eyes of the rulers. Within the widening discursive practices, new discursive collectives had developed (Ruutsoo 2000: 58-59).

DISCOURSE OF ANTI-TERRORISM

When the Cold War rhetoric lost its actuality, a new ideological opposition developed after the events of September 11, 2001. The phrasing of the new opposition was adopted from Samuel Huntington’s (1996) book “The Clash of Civilizations”. Huntington solidified his contentious diagnosis that the world was entering a new phase of geopolitical dynamics, characterized by a clash of primordial civilizations. Academically, his thesis drew scathing criticism. At a more popular level, the image he drew of a globe divided along clear civilizational lines, with Islam and the West representing two of the major opponents, has attained a mythic quality. Since the attack on the World Trade Center in September 2001, the media has played a crucial role in the developing discourse on contemporary terrorism.

The new narrative, which has been formulated by the president of the USA and his administration, has very quickly become one of the most influential global narratives. As the president of the world’s most authoritative country, George Bush was able to rapidly find audience for the new narrative in global media and to describe the new world order in his wording. The symbolic codes were interpreted to suggest the terrorist attacks were acts of war, and the American response must include military intervention. This war frame was not seriously challenged in the 104 editorials.

According to Michel Ryan (2004) Americans struggled after September 11, 2001 to create universal meaning within a symbolic system in which many traditional meanings were shattered. Languages that Americans used before the attacks to cope with and to understand (or to frame) reality did not serve them well after attacks. Americans were no longer sure about the meaning of such words as safety, security, terrorism, peace, progress, war and American. Political and religious leaders, citizens and the media seek during crises to create narratives that explain and assign meaning to events or issues. Federicia Ferrari (2007: 606-619) investigated George Bush’s political discourse of ‘preventive war’. Fear strategy by Americans was established to justify the need for "homeland protection". The opposing logic, with which post 9/11 has been treated, recalls that bipolar ideological cliché typical of Cold War discourse. Editorial writers for the 10 largest newspapers in the US, created a singular symbolic narrative about possible military strikes in that new kind of war. The creation of the war narrative was according to M. Ryan (2004: 377) an exercise of power. The symbolic codes were interpreted to suggest the terrorist attacks were acts of war, and the American response must include military intervention. This war frame was not seriously challenged in the 104 editorials.

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According to Douglas Kellner (2005) the mainstream media privileged the “clash of civilization” model, established a binary dualism between Islamic terrorism and civilization, and largely circulated war fever and discourses that called for and supported a form of military intervention. Kellner also shows how corporate media ownership, linked with a rightward shift of establishment media, has come to dominate news coverage and distract the public from the substance of real public issues. Exploring the role of media spectacle in the 9/11 attacks and subsequent Terror Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Kellner documents the centrality of media politics in advancing foreign policy agendas and militarism.

The Bush Administration was unambiguous in its definition of the 9/11 situations: the U.S. had been invaded by evil people who hated “the American way of life.” Who caused the 9/11 attacks is an empirical question in the intellectual, rational, and legal modes of discourse; the answer requires resource-consuming investigations. In a religious mode of discourse, one can answer such questions immediately with a statement such as “evil caused the attacks” (Chang, Mehan, 2006: 18). The Bush administration with help from many world leaders was framing its own narrative; they successfully framed the world as polar opposites (Ryan, 2004: 378).

One ideologically important keyword, that is adopted in political rhetoric and which is used to mobilize the opposition, is the crusade metaphor. The notion of a crusade is used by Bush (2001) in his speech, where he states, “This crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while”. George Bush (2001) gives a very elastic definition of an evil. Other words he used: evil-doers, terrorists, suicide bombers; barbaric, evil people. They can't stand freedom and hate what America stands for.

The crusade narrative became the marker of a great opposition, which was also widely used in the international media. “This is a pure Zionist crusade,” claimed Muammar al-Gaddafi, using Al-Qaeda rhetoric, after French air force missiles had hit their first targets in Manghaz. In any case, the newly emerged contemporary interest towards the history of the crusades is directly connected to international relations. After the collapse of the WTC twin towers, western bookstores were filled with general treatments of the crusades; previously such publishing was unthinkable for publishing houses. (Tiit Aleksejev 2011.)

Ulrich Beck (2002: 44-45) asks: Who defines the identity of a trans-national terrorist? Neither judges, nor international courts, but powerful governments and states. Terrorist enemy images are de-territorialized, de-nationalized and flexible state constructions that legitimize the global intervention of military power as self-defence. Bush insisted that permanent mobilization of the American nation was required, that the military budget be vastly increased, that civil liberties be restricted and that critics be chided as unpatriotic. The terrorist threat was reproduced by the global media.

War propaganda is also connected to mass culture and computer games, where the player can fight against Islam terrorism. The movie “Black Hawk Down”, based on the events in Somalia in 1992 and a computer game also based on it, can be cited as an example of this. In turn Hezbolla has created war games, where one can fight against “the new western colonialism.” (Machin, Van Leewen, 2007.)

Already familiar rhetoric from the Cold War period is used to justify new war activity. Larry Diamond (2002: 16), “Winning the New Cold War on Terrorism: The Democratic-Governance Imperative”: One of the main sources of terrorism is chronically bad governance. The international campaign against terrorism can thus be characterized as a new Cold War: a strategy for victory requires the creation of regimes that can achieve the universal goals of freedom and development.”

According to Jules Lobel (2001: 24) the end of the Cold War did lead to some relaxation of the feeling of perpetual crisis that had pervaded post World War II America. The 1990s witnessed the United States defense against various threats – Saddam Hussein, drugs, illegal immigrants, terrorists, rogue states, dictators who abused human rights – but without the overriding sense of fear and national crisis of the prior four decades. The post September 11 war against terrorism has taken on frighteningly similar aspects to the Cold War against Communism.

The anti-terrorism war discourse after September 11, has been adopted in the western information sphere, including in Estonia. For instance, according to Tiit Hemnoste (2008:139) labelling a Muslim as a terrorist is widespread in the Estonian media. Defence of democratic values has become the general leading principle of Estonian defence policy. Estonia’s leading principle in conducting foreign and security policy is the principle of un-divided security, the importance of international cooperation and the defence of democratic values (Eesti Riigikaitse 2011).
An anti-terrorism war has now replaced the Cold War rhetoric and increasing military activity is justified by the defence of democratic values.

**DISCOURSE OF DEFENDING DEMOCRATIC VALUES**

The present paper observes how the great opposition narrative was constructed in the Soviet Union and in the world after September 11, 2011 and which linguistic choices were used to discursively maintain this, how people were mobilized and military activity justified. Discursive oppositions are constructed both in the totalitarian Soviet society, as well as in the modern democratic western society in order to justify governmental aggressiveness and political interests.

The Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism ideology became absolute in the Soviet Union. It was formulated through the main narrative of communism building. Interdiscursively the discourse of war and fighting dominated. The discourse was upheld by reviving the narratives of the Great Socialist October Revolution and the victory of the Great Patriotic War. The order of discourse was upheld through speeches of leaders, party congresses and clearly regulated media broadcasts, because in the Soviet Union, media was clearly censored. The hegemonic status of the main narrative was ensured because in the Soviet Union there was no opportunity to formulate an alternative narrative.

The Cold War rhetoric in the Soviet Union meant linguistic militarization of life: interdiscursively war rhetoric penetrated as the language of describing everyday life in the media and as a means of mobilizing people. Linguistically, this meant giving heroic status to work through the following key-words and permanent constructions: victories at work front, working hero, socialist competition, victory of work, army of workers, etc. Markers of us in language were: peace holders, peace fighters. They were signified as fascists, people’s enemies, international imperialism, etc. Use of language was euphemistic: the Soviet Society was described as a democratic society, its politics were one of peace and defensive armament.

For 10 years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, we lived in a period free of enemies; then a new global opposition was constructed. During the Soviet period we fought against international imperialism: now we fight against international terrorism. Both main narratives, the one of the Soviet Union and the one phrased by George Bush, are formulated by the political elite and made legitimate through mass media. Both narratives take place under the auspices of defending democratic values.

Our discourse was constructed linguistically in both societies from the need to defend democracy and in the world after 11 September, from the need to defend Christian values as well. The difference lies in the fact that the border of anti-terrorism war relies on the border of culture and perhaps also religions. Instead of military and offensive activity, euphemisms are used. Linguistically military activity is legitimized by the need to defend democratic values.

If we generalize, we can state that both the Soviet and the post-September 11 media followed the Soviet propaganda principles of designing and presenting media texts:

- The important aspects in presenting the material are self-confidence and, in some topics, aggressiveness as well. Self-confidence gives an impression of being infallible and nips non-conformity in the bud.
- In order to achieve wide-spread acceptance, emotional and fear provoking rhetoric was used.
- It was attempted to create an “us” against “them”, by making the recipient of the message choose the “right side”.
- Lies were presented with unaffected self-confidence.
- Tendentious and fabricated single examples were presented as general norm.
- Opposition and different opinions were ignored.
- Emotional influencing was used in order to exclude rational analysis.
- Falsifications were used, as long as the receiver of information could not control what was presented.
- Comments and evaluations were stressed. Presenting a fact without comments has a short-term effect, but an attitude towards the presented facts is remembered for a long time. (Löhmus, 1999: 78.)

After 9/11, there was strong manipulation of public opinion in order to dramatically raise military spending, legitimize military intervention and pass legislation that imposed severe restrictions on civil rights and freedoms. Citizens were manipulated into believing that such measures were taken in order to protect them (van Dijk, 2006: 370).

There are many books and articles on manipulating public opinion after the events of September 11 (Naifez Mosadeedque Ahmed, 2005; Noam Chomsky, 2004; Bradley S. Greenberg, 2002; Fred Halliday, 2002; Nancy Palmer, 2003; Slavoj Žižek, 2002; Hodge, Adam and Nilep, Chad, 2006, etc.).

According to Richard Jackson (2007), the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ has become a ubiquitous
feature of Western political and academic counter-terrorism discourse. Examining over 300 political and academic texts and employing a discourse analytic approach, Jackson described and dissected the central terms, assumptions, labels, narratives and genealogical roots of the language and knowledge of ‘Islamic terrorism’ and reflected on its practical and normative consequences. Jackson concluded that for the most part, political and academic discourses of ‘Islamic terrorism’ are unhelpful, not least because they are highly politicized, intellectually contestable, damaging to community relations and practically counter-productive.

The examples of immigration, political violence and anti-terrorist ideologies involve strong opinions, attitudes and ideologies, and are textbook examples of governments and media manipulating the population at large, as they also were manipulated by the ‘Red scare’ of anti-communist ideologies in the Cold War (Van Dijk, 2006: 370).

The rationale of political discourse is intrinsically rooted in the consent of its audience, all the more so within a political system that defines and frames itself as democratic. The crucial historical moment represented by post 9/11, which saw the United States as the principal agent and operator on the international scene, is responsible for the hardening of American political rhetoric as one of the distinctive feature of a ‘securitization’ and preventive war programme. (Ferrari, 2007: 606-607).

The war on terrorism script maintains its primacy in guiding U.S. foreign policy. It allows the United States – the most military powerful nation in human history – to legitimize and wage future wars without the need to justify actions with specific empirical evidence. (Chang, Mehan, 2006: 19).

Noam Chomsky (2002: 74) defines terrorism as something that “they use against us” and where “we and our allies are the main victims of terrorism”. Such justification is used to legitimize military activity to protect society, an attack is justified euphemistically with the need for preventive defence. In every society military activity, first and foremost, serves the cause of increasing political and economic influence; social agents justify it with noble causes such as the need for preventive defensive activity and the need to defend democratic values.

LITERATURE


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