South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role

South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role

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La competencia geoestratégica entre la red de seguridad liderada por Estados Unidos en el Indo-Pacífico y China se está intensi­ficando. En medio de la rivalidad hegemó­nica entre estos dos países, Corea del Sur surge como un actor que busca encontrar su lugar en esta creciente rivalidad entre Washington y Pekín. A pesar de ser un socio estratégico formal de Estados Uni­dos, es común en la literatura académica argumentar que Seúl ha mostrado un com­portamiento similar al hedging a lo largo de los años. En este artículo demostramos que el entorno estratégico, caracterizado por niveles variados de percepción de ame­nazas, y las orientaciones políticas de los líderes respecto a Corea del Norte son cru­ciales para dar forma al comportamien­to estratégico de Corea del Sur (hedging, balancing o bandwagoning). Evaluamos el comportamiento de Corea del Sur utili­zando un análisis realista neoclásico de las percepciones de sus líderes respecto a Corea del Norte, Estados Unidos y China. Las variables independientes incluyen la distri­bución de poder en el sistema internacional, el contexto regional, la interdependencia económica y la red de alianzas de Estados Unidos. Nuestras variables intervinientes son las percepciones de los líderes, especí­ficamente sus evaluaciones de riesgo, y las imágenes que guían sus decisiones de hed­ging, balancing o bandwagoning con China y Estados Unidos. La investigación se llevó a cabo a través de un análisis bibliográfico y un examen de documentos oficiales, inclui­dos libros blancos, informes de defensa y discursos oficiales. Un hallazgo clave es que comprender el comportamiento de seguri­dad de Seúl requiere un examen cuidadoso de las acciones de Corea del Norte. Además, la decisión de hacer hedging o balancing no está impulsada por factores ideológicos; más bien, proviene de la percepción de cuál de los dos –China o Estados Unidos– apoya mejor las estrategias políticas de Seúl y sus relaciones esperadas con Pyongyang.

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