Los vínculos entre la regulación y el desarrollo: una discusión teórico-conceptual con implicaciones para América Latina
The Links Between Regulation and Development: A Theoretical conceptual Discussion with Implications for Latin America
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¿Cómo se relacionan la regulación y el desarrollo? A pesar de la centralidad de esta cuestión para el mundo de la investigación y para la práctica, pocos estudios han reflexionado sobre el nexo entre regulación y desarrollo. Los estudios existentes se ocupan principalmente del diseño y funcionamiento de instituciones e instrumentos regulatorios en los países desarrollados. Sin embargo, las propuestas regulatorias sobre los países “en desarrollo” se han mantenido a nivel general. Este artículo busca ampliar nuestra comprensión sobre la forma en que se relacionan la regulación y el desarrollo. A continuación, presentamos los debates y temas clave, así como un marco analítico que incorpora las diversas dimensiones del vínculo entre la regulación y el desarrollo. Además, analizamos ejemplos destacados de la literatura sobre regulación en América Latina y ofrecemos algunas ideas para futuras investigaciones en la materia.
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