Análisis experimental de la corrupción y de las medidas anticorrupción. ¿Dónde estamos, hacia dónde vamos?
Experimental Analysis of Corruption and Anti-corruption Measures – Where are we and where are we going?
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Boehm, F., Isaza E, C. y Villalba Díaz, M.L. 2015. Análisis experimental de la corrupción y de las medidas anticorrupción. ¿Dónde estamos, hacia dónde vamos?. Opera. 17, 17 (dic. 2015), 105–126. DOI:https://doi.org/10.18601/16578651.n17.06.
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Este artículo presenta una discusión de la literatura interdisciplinar reciente sobre el estudio empírico y experimental de la corrupción. El análisis empírico de la corrupción se ve dificultado por su naturaleza ilícita. En las dos últimas décadas, han prevalecido estudios econométricos basados en datos de percepción de corrupción. Si bien estos han avanzado nuestro entendimiento del fenómeno, cada vez más se notan los límites de esta metodología al establecer causalidades y explorar los fundamentos de la toma de decisión corrupta o ética de los individuos. Recientemente, las literaturas económica, política, psicológica y organizacional han aplicado el método experimental para entender mejor el comportamiento corrupto y probar medidas anticorrupción. La revisión presenta y discute los principales aportes de esta literatura y así brinda un punto de partida para seguir investigando las preguntas abiertas.
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Abbink, K. (2006). Laboratory experiments on corruption. En Rose-Ackerman, S. (ed.). International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption (pp. 418-440). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Abbink, K.; Irlenbusch, B. y Renner, E. 2002. An Experimental Bribery Game. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 18 (2), 428-454.
Abbink, K. y Serra, D. (2012). Anti-corruption Policies: Lessons from the Lab. En Wantchekon, D. y Wantchekon, L. (eds.) Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption. London: Emerald Books.
Aidt, T. S. (2011). Corruption and Sustainable Development. En Rose-Ackerman, S. y Søreide, T. (eds.). International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption (pp. 3-51). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Alatas, V.; Cameron, L.; Chaudhuri, A.; Erkal, N. y Gangadharan, L. (2009). Subject Pool Effects in a Corruption Experiment: A Comparison of Indonesian Public Servants and Indonesian Students. Experimental Economics, 12 (1), 113-132.
Andvig, J. C. (2005). Experimental economics and corruption: a survey of budding research. En Transparency International (ed.). Global Corruption Report. Corruption in Construction and Post-conflict Reconstruction (pp. 265-267). London: Pluto Press.
Anechiarico, F. y Jacobs, J. B. (1996). The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity. How corruption control makes government ineffective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Armantier, O. y Boly, A. (2010). ¿Can Corruption Be Studied in the Lab? Working Paper.
Armantier, O. y Boly, A. (2011). A controlled field experiment on corruption. European Economic Review, 55, 1072-1082.
Armantier, O. y Boly, A. (2012). On the external validity of labroatory experiments on corruption. En Wantchekon, D. y Wantchekon, L. (eds.). Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption. London: Emerald Books.
Ariely, D. (2012). The Honest Truth about Dishonesty: How We Lie to Everyone – Especially Ourselves. New York: Harper Collins.
Azfar, O. y Nelson, W. R. Jr. (2007). Transparency, Wages, and the Separation of Powers: An Experimental Analysis of Corruption. Public Choice, 130 (3/4), 471-493.
Banco Mundial (2015). World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society, and Behavior. Washington y New York: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank.
Bateson, M.; Nettle, D. y Roberts, G. (2006). Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a realworld setting. Biology Letters, 2 (3), 412-414.
Barr, A. y Serra, D. (2009). The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment. Experimental Economics, 12, 488-503.
Berninghaus, S. K.; Haller, S.; Krüger, T.; Neumann, T.; Schosser, S. y Vogt, B. (2013). Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a corruption Game - An experimental analysis. Journal of Economic Psychology, 34, 46-60.
Bertin, J. M. (2010). Fighting corruption: Should we rely on altruistic punishment? Working Paper Department of Social Science.
Beu, D. S.; Buckley, M. R. y Harvey, M. G. (2003). Ethical decision-making: A Multidimensional Construct. Business Ethics, 12 (1), 88-107.
Binmore, K. y Klemperer, P. (2002). The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences. The Economic Journal, 112 (478), C74-C96.
Bobkova, N. y Egbert, H. (2012). Corruption Investigated in the Lab: A Survey of the Experimental Literature. International Journal of Latest Trends in Finance and Economic Sciences, 2 (4), 337-349.
Boehm, F. y Lambsdorff, J. G. (2009). Corrupción y anticorrupción: una perspectiva neoinstitucional. Revista de Economía Institucional, 11 (21), 45-72.
Brañas Garza, P. (ed.) (2011). Economía experimental y de comportamiento. Barcelona: Antoni Bosch Büchner, S.; Freytag, A.; González, L. G. y Güth, W. (2008). Bribery and Public procurement: An experimental study. Public Choice, 137 (1/2), 103-117.
Burke, R. J. (2009). Greed. En Burke, R. J. y Cooper, C. L. (eds.). Research companion to corruption in organizations (pp. 33-59). Northampton: Edward Elgar.
Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (Roundtable Series in Behavioral Economics). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Campos-Ortiz, F. (2011). Experience, Attitudes and Corrupt Behavior: Insights from an Experiment on Bribery. Working Paper Department of Economics.
DeCelles, K. A.; DeRue, D. S., Margolis, J. D., Joshua, D. y Ceranic, T. (2012). Does Power Corrupt or Enable? When and Why Power Facilitates Self-Interested Behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 97 (3), 681-689.
De Fine Licht, J.; Naurin, D.; Esaiasson, P. y Gilljam, M. (2014). When Does Transparency Generate Legitimacy? Experimenting on a Context-Bound Relationship. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 27 (1), 111-134.
Drugov, M.; Hamman, J. y Serra, D. (2014). Intermediaries in Corruption: An Experiment. Experimental Economics, 17, 78-99.
Druckman, J. N.; Green, P. D.; Kuklinski, H. J. y Lupia, A. (2006). The Growth and Development of Experimental Research in Political Science. American Political Science Review, 100 (4), 627-36.
Dunning, T. (2012). Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach (Strategies for Social Inquiry). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Dusek, L.; Ortmann, A. y Lízal, L. (2005). Understanding Corruption and Corruptibility through Experiments. Prague Economic Papers, 2, 147-162.
Frank, B. y Schulze, G. G. (2000). Does economics make citizens corrupt? Journal of Economic Organization & Behavior, 43, 101-113.
Frank, B.; Lambsdorff, J. G. y Boehm, F. (2011). Gender and Corruption: Lessons from Laboratory Corruption Experiments. European Journal of Development Research, 23 (1), 59-71.
Frank, R. H., Gilovich, T. D. y Regan, D. T. (1996). ¿Do Economists Make Bad Citizens? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (1), 187-192.
Feddersen, T.; Gailmard, S. y Sandroni, A. (2009). Moral bias in large elections: Theory and Experimental evidence. American Political Science Review, 103 (2), 175-192.
Fink, H. y Boehm, F. (2011). Corrupción en la policía de tránsito. Una primera aproximación a través de entrevistas con taxistas colombianos. Revista Relaciones, 32 (126), 67-85.
Friedman, D. y Cassar, A. (eds.) (2004). Economics Lab. An intensive course in experimental economics. London y New York: Routledge.
Gino, F. y Ariely, D. (2012). The dark side of creativity: Original thinkers can be more dishonest. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102 (3), 445-459.
Gino, F. y Bazerman, M. H. (2009). When misconduct goes unnoticed: The acceptability of gradual erosion in others’ unethical behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45 (4), 708-719.
Gino, F.; Ayal, S. y Ariely, D. (2009). Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior. Psychological Science, 20 (3), 393-398.
Gino, F.; Schweitzer, M. E.; Mead, N. L. y Ariely, D. (2011). Unable to resist temptation: Hoe solfcontrol depletion promotes unethical behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115 (2), 191-203.
Gintis, H. (2009). The Bounds of Reason. Game Theory and the unification of the bahvioral sciences. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
González, A. C. y Boehm, F. (2013). Medir la corrupción:de la generación de conciencia a los peligros de la mala interpretación. Revista Ópera, 11, 259-277.
Guala, F. (2002). On the scope of experiments in economics: Comments on Siakantaris. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26 (2), 261-267.
Heine, S. J.; Takemoto, T.; Moskalenko, S.; Lasaleta, J. y Henrich, J. (2008). Mirrors in the Head: Cultural Variation in Objective Self-Awareness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34 (7), 879-887.
Hertwig, R. y Ortmann, A. (2008). Deception in Experiments: Revisiting the Arguments in its Defense. Ethics and Behaviour, 18 (1), 59-92.
Hulbert, L. (2004). Experimental Research Designs. En Breakwell, G. M. (ed.). Doing Social Psychology Research. Oxford: BPS Blackwell.
Isaza, C. (2011). El fracaso de la lucha anticorrupción en Colombia. Revista Ópera, 11, 221-239.
Kish-Gephart, J. J.; Harrison, D. A. y Treviño, L. K. (2010). Bad apples, bad cases, and bad barrels: Meta-Analytical Evidence about Sources of Unethical Decisions at Work. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95 (1), 1-31.
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2012). Behavioral and experimental economics as a guidance to anticorruption. En Wantchekon, D. y Wantchekon, L. (eds.). Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption. London: Emerald Books.
Lambsdorff, J. G. y Frank, B. (2010). Bribing versus gift-giving – An experiment. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31 (3), 347-357.
Lambsdorff, J. G. y Frank, B. (2011). Corrupt reciprocity – Experimental evidence on a men’s game. International Review of Law and Economics, 31 (2), 116-125.
Liljenquist, K.; Chen-Bo Zhong, C-B. y Galinsky, A. D. (2010). The Smell of Virtue: Clean Scents Promote Reciprocity and Charity. Psychological Science, 21 (3), 381-383.
Mazar, N. y Ariely, D. (2006). Dishonesty in everyday life and its policy implications. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 25 (1), 1-21.
Mazar, N.; Amir, O. y Ariely, D. (2008). The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of self-concept maintenance. Journal of Marketing Research, 45, 633-644.
Misas, G. (2005). La lucha anticorrupción en Colombia. Bogotá: Contraloría General de la Nación.
Moro, R. y Freidin, E. (2012). Estudios experimentales sobre corrupción y el problema de la validez externa. Interdisciplinaria, 29 (2), 223-233.
Olken, B. (2007). Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in indonesia. Journal of Political Economy, 115 (2), 200-249.
Peisakhin, L. y Pinto, P. (2010). Is transparency an effective anti-corruption strategy? Evidence from a field experiment in india. Regulation & Governance, 4, 261-280.
Rey-Biel, P. (2008). Economía experimental y teoría de juegos. En Aguilar, F., Barragán, J. y Lara, N. (eds). Economía, sociedad y teoría de juegos (pp. 137-151). Madrid: McGrawHill.
Ryvkin, D. y Serra, D. (2013). Does competition among public officials reduce corruption? An experiment. Working Paper Department of Economics.
Rothstein, B. y Eek, D. (2009). Political Corruption and Social Trust: An Experimental Approach. Rationality and Society, 21 (1), 81-112.
Schikora, J. (2010). Four Essays on Corruption and Cooperation. Theory and Evidence. München: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität.
Schulze, G. G. y Frank, B. (2003). Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility. Economics of Governance, 4, 143-160.
Serra, D. y Wantchekon, L. (eds.) (2012). Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption. London: Emerald Books.
Stoker, G. (2010). Exploring the Promise of Experimentation in Political Science: Micro-Foundational Insights and Policy Relevance. Political Studies, 58 (2), 300-319. Tversky, A. y Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational choice and the framing of decisions. The Journal of Business, 59 (4/2), S251-S278.
Treviño, L. K.; Weaver, G. R. y Reynolds, S. J. (2006). Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review. Journal of Management, 32 (6), 951-990.
Veldhuizen, R. (2013). The influence of wages on public officials’ corruptibility: A laboratory investigation. Journal of Economic Psychology,39, 341-356.
Zhong, C-B. y Liljenquist, K. (2006). Washing away your sins: threatened morality and physical cleansing. Science, 313 (5792), 1451-2.
Abbink, K.; Irlenbusch, B. y Renner, E. 2002. An Experimental Bribery Game. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 18 (2), 428-454.
Abbink, K. y Serra, D. (2012). Anti-corruption Policies: Lessons from the Lab. En Wantchekon, D. y Wantchekon, L. (eds.) Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption. London: Emerald Books.
Aidt, T. S. (2011). Corruption and Sustainable Development. En Rose-Ackerman, S. y Søreide, T. (eds.). International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption (pp. 3-51). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Alatas, V.; Cameron, L.; Chaudhuri, A.; Erkal, N. y Gangadharan, L. (2009). Subject Pool Effects in a Corruption Experiment: A Comparison of Indonesian Public Servants and Indonesian Students. Experimental Economics, 12 (1), 113-132.
Andvig, J. C. (2005). Experimental economics and corruption: a survey of budding research. En Transparency International (ed.). Global Corruption Report. Corruption in Construction and Post-conflict Reconstruction (pp. 265-267). London: Pluto Press.
Anechiarico, F. y Jacobs, J. B. (1996). The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity. How corruption control makes government ineffective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Armantier, O. y Boly, A. (2010). ¿Can Corruption Be Studied in the Lab? Working Paper.
Armantier, O. y Boly, A. (2011). A controlled field experiment on corruption. European Economic Review, 55, 1072-1082.
Armantier, O. y Boly, A. (2012). On the external validity of labroatory experiments on corruption. En Wantchekon, D. y Wantchekon, L. (eds.). Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption. London: Emerald Books.
Ariely, D. (2012). The Honest Truth about Dishonesty: How We Lie to Everyone – Especially Ourselves. New York: Harper Collins.
Azfar, O. y Nelson, W. R. Jr. (2007). Transparency, Wages, and the Separation of Powers: An Experimental Analysis of Corruption. Public Choice, 130 (3/4), 471-493.
Banco Mundial (2015). World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society, and Behavior. Washington y New York: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank.
Bateson, M.; Nettle, D. y Roberts, G. (2006). Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a realworld setting. Biology Letters, 2 (3), 412-414.
Barr, A. y Serra, D. (2009). The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment. Experimental Economics, 12, 488-503.
Berninghaus, S. K.; Haller, S.; Krüger, T.; Neumann, T.; Schosser, S. y Vogt, B. (2013). Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in a corruption Game - An experimental analysis. Journal of Economic Psychology, 34, 46-60.
Bertin, J. M. (2010). Fighting corruption: Should we rely on altruistic punishment? Working Paper Department of Social Science.
Beu, D. S.; Buckley, M. R. y Harvey, M. G. (2003). Ethical decision-making: A Multidimensional Construct. Business Ethics, 12 (1), 88-107.
Binmore, K. y Klemperer, P. (2002). The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences. The Economic Journal, 112 (478), C74-C96.
Bobkova, N. y Egbert, H. (2012). Corruption Investigated in the Lab: A Survey of the Experimental Literature. International Journal of Latest Trends in Finance and Economic Sciences, 2 (4), 337-349.
Boehm, F. y Lambsdorff, J. G. (2009). Corrupción y anticorrupción: una perspectiva neoinstitucional. Revista de Economía Institucional, 11 (21), 45-72.
Brañas Garza, P. (ed.) (2011). Economía experimental y de comportamiento. Barcelona: Antoni Bosch Büchner, S.; Freytag, A.; González, L. G. y Güth, W. (2008). Bribery and Public procurement: An experimental study. Public Choice, 137 (1/2), 103-117.
Burke, R. J. (2009). Greed. En Burke, R. J. y Cooper, C. L. (eds.). Research companion to corruption in organizations (pp. 33-59). Northampton: Edward Elgar.
Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (Roundtable Series in Behavioral Economics). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Campos-Ortiz, F. (2011). Experience, Attitudes and Corrupt Behavior: Insights from an Experiment on Bribery. Working Paper Department of Economics.
DeCelles, K. A.; DeRue, D. S., Margolis, J. D., Joshua, D. y Ceranic, T. (2012). Does Power Corrupt or Enable? When and Why Power Facilitates Self-Interested Behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 97 (3), 681-689.
De Fine Licht, J.; Naurin, D.; Esaiasson, P. y Gilljam, M. (2014). When Does Transparency Generate Legitimacy? Experimenting on a Context-Bound Relationship. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 27 (1), 111-134.
Drugov, M.; Hamman, J. y Serra, D. (2014). Intermediaries in Corruption: An Experiment. Experimental Economics, 17, 78-99.
Druckman, J. N.; Green, P. D.; Kuklinski, H. J. y Lupia, A. (2006). The Growth and Development of Experimental Research in Political Science. American Political Science Review, 100 (4), 627-36.
Dunning, T. (2012). Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach (Strategies for Social Inquiry). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Dusek, L.; Ortmann, A. y Lízal, L. (2005). Understanding Corruption and Corruptibility through Experiments. Prague Economic Papers, 2, 147-162.
Frank, B. y Schulze, G. G. (2000). Does economics make citizens corrupt? Journal of Economic Organization & Behavior, 43, 101-113.
Frank, B.; Lambsdorff, J. G. y Boehm, F. (2011). Gender and Corruption: Lessons from Laboratory Corruption Experiments. European Journal of Development Research, 23 (1), 59-71.
Frank, R. H., Gilovich, T. D. y Regan, D. T. (1996). ¿Do Economists Make Bad Citizens? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (1), 187-192.
Feddersen, T.; Gailmard, S. y Sandroni, A. (2009). Moral bias in large elections: Theory and Experimental evidence. American Political Science Review, 103 (2), 175-192.
Fink, H. y Boehm, F. (2011). Corrupción en la policía de tránsito. Una primera aproximación a través de entrevistas con taxistas colombianos. Revista Relaciones, 32 (126), 67-85.
Friedman, D. y Cassar, A. (eds.) (2004). Economics Lab. An intensive course in experimental economics. London y New York: Routledge.
Gino, F. y Ariely, D. (2012). The dark side of creativity: Original thinkers can be more dishonest. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102 (3), 445-459.
Gino, F. y Bazerman, M. H. (2009). When misconduct goes unnoticed: The acceptability of gradual erosion in others’ unethical behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45 (4), 708-719.
Gino, F.; Ayal, S. y Ariely, D. (2009). Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior. Psychological Science, 20 (3), 393-398.
Gino, F.; Schweitzer, M. E.; Mead, N. L. y Ariely, D. (2011). Unable to resist temptation: Hoe solfcontrol depletion promotes unethical behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115 (2), 191-203.
Gintis, H. (2009). The Bounds of Reason. Game Theory and the unification of the bahvioral sciences. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
González, A. C. y Boehm, F. (2013). Medir la corrupción:de la generación de conciencia a los peligros de la mala interpretación. Revista Ópera, 11, 259-277.
Guala, F. (2002). On the scope of experiments in economics: Comments on Siakantaris. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26 (2), 261-267.
Heine, S. J.; Takemoto, T.; Moskalenko, S.; Lasaleta, J. y Henrich, J. (2008). Mirrors in the Head: Cultural Variation in Objective Self-Awareness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34 (7), 879-887.
Hertwig, R. y Ortmann, A. (2008). Deception in Experiments: Revisiting the Arguments in its Defense. Ethics and Behaviour, 18 (1), 59-92.
Hulbert, L. (2004). Experimental Research Designs. En Breakwell, G. M. (ed.). Doing Social Psychology Research. Oxford: BPS Blackwell.
Isaza, C. (2011). El fracaso de la lucha anticorrupción en Colombia. Revista Ópera, 11, 221-239.
Kish-Gephart, J. J.; Harrison, D. A. y Treviño, L. K. (2010). Bad apples, bad cases, and bad barrels: Meta-Analytical Evidence about Sources of Unethical Decisions at Work. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95 (1), 1-31.
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2012). Behavioral and experimental economics as a guidance to anticorruption. En Wantchekon, D. y Wantchekon, L. (eds.). Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption. London: Emerald Books.
Lambsdorff, J. G. y Frank, B. (2010). Bribing versus gift-giving – An experiment. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31 (3), 347-357.
Lambsdorff, J. G. y Frank, B. (2011). Corrupt reciprocity – Experimental evidence on a men’s game. International Review of Law and Economics, 31 (2), 116-125.
Liljenquist, K.; Chen-Bo Zhong, C-B. y Galinsky, A. D. (2010). The Smell of Virtue: Clean Scents Promote Reciprocity and Charity. Psychological Science, 21 (3), 381-383.
Mazar, N. y Ariely, D. (2006). Dishonesty in everyday life and its policy implications. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 25 (1), 1-21.
Mazar, N.; Amir, O. y Ariely, D. (2008). The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of self-concept maintenance. Journal of Marketing Research, 45, 633-644.
Misas, G. (2005). La lucha anticorrupción en Colombia. Bogotá: Contraloría General de la Nación.
Moro, R. y Freidin, E. (2012). Estudios experimentales sobre corrupción y el problema de la validez externa. Interdisciplinaria, 29 (2), 223-233.
Olken, B. (2007). Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in indonesia. Journal of Political Economy, 115 (2), 200-249.
Peisakhin, L. y Pinto, P. (2010). Is transparency an effective anti-corruption strategy? Evidence from a field experiment in india. Regulation & Governance, 4, 261-280.
Rey-Biel, P. (2008). Economía experimental y teoría de juegos. En Aguilar, F., Barragán, J. y Lara, N. (eds). Economía, sociedad y teoría de juegos (pp. 137-151). Madrid: McGrawHill.
Ryvkin, D. y Serra, D. (2013). Does competition among public officials reduce corruption? An experiment. Working Paper Department of Economics.
Rothstein, B. y Eek, D. (2009). Political Corruption and Social Trust: An Experimental Approach. Rationality and Society, 21 (1), 81-112.
Schikora, J. (2010). Four Essays on Corruption and Cooperation. Theory and Evidence. München: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität.
Schulze, G. G. y Frank, B. (2003). Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility. Economics of Governance, 4, 143-160.
Serra, D. y Wantchekon, L. (eds.) (2012). Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption. London: Emerald Books.
Stoker, G. (2010). Exploring the Promise of Experimentation in Political Science: Micro-Foundational Insights and Policy Relevance. Political Studies, 58 (2), 300-319. Tversky, A. y Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational choice and the framing of decisions. The Journal of Business, 59 (4/2), S251-S278.
Treviño, L. K.; Weaver, G. R. y Reynolds, S. J. (2006). Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review. Journal of Management, 32 (6), 951-990.
Veldhuizen, R. (2013). The influence of wages on public officials’ corruptibility: A laboratory investigation. Journal of Economic Psychology,39, 341-356.
Zhong, C-B. y Liljenquist, K. (2006). Washing away your sins: threatened morality and physical cleansing. Science, 313 (5792), 1451-2.
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