Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo

Main Article Content


Jorge Luis Trujillo Alfaro
Juan Carlos Garay Forero


La Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991 implementó herramientas de planeación económica para alcanzar el desarrollo económico en el largo plazo. Sin embargo, estableció que cada Gobierno debe implementar un Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Este escrito explica la interpretación legal de la expresión “largo plazo” en un contexto en que las herramientas regulatorias también son relevantes para alcanzar los objetivos del desarrollo económico.

Palabras clave:

Article Details


Creative Commons License
Esta obra está bajo licencia internacional Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.


Adelman, J. (2013). Worldly Philosopher: The Odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman. Princeton University Press.

Alchian, Armen A. “Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory.” The Journal of Political Economy (1950): 211-221.

Boyck o Maxim, Shleifer Andrei and Vishny Robert W. (1996) “A Theory of Privatization.” The Economic Journal, Vol. 106, No. 435 (Mar)

Coase, Ronald Harr y. “The nature of the firm.”Economica 4, n.° 16 (1937): 386-405.

Coase, Ronald Harr y. “The Problem of social cost” Journal of law & economics. 3 (1960): 1.

Coase, Ronald Harr y. “Accounting and the theory of the firm.” Journal of Accounting and Economics (1990): 3-13.

Cox Gary “The Efficient Secret: The cabinet and the development of political parties in Victorian England.” Cambridge University Press.

Cox, Gary. “The Organization of Democratic Legislatures”, en The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, editado por Barry Weingast y Donald Wittman (2006) Oxford University Press.

Dell, Melissa. (2010). “The persistent effects of Peru’s mining mita.” Econometrica, 78(6), 1.863-1.903.

Downs, Anthony. “An economic theory of political action in a democracy.” The Journal of Political Economy (1957): 135-150.

Evans, P. & Bellamy, S. (1995). “Performance evaluation in the Australian public sector: The role of management and cost accounting control systems.” International Journal of Public Sector Management, 8(6).

Fogel, Robert W. (1994). “Economic Growth, Population Theory, and Physiology: The Bearing of Long-Term Processes on the Making of Economic Policy.” The American Economic Review, 84(3), 369-395.

Guinand, L. M. (2014). The changing role of the central planning offices Latin America: a comparative historical analysis perspective (1950-2013). Maastricht University.

Hardin, Garr ett . “The tragedy of the commons.” Science 162, n.° 3859 (1968): 1.243-1.248.

Hayek, Friedrich August. “The use of knowledge in society.” The American economic review (1945): 519-530.

Hayek, Friedrich August. Law, legislation and liberty: a new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy. Routledge, 2012.

Keynes, John Maynard (1971) Collected writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol 4. (A tract on Monetary Reform). Macmillian.

Kornai, Janos (1986). The soft budget constraint. Kyklos, 39(1), 3-30.

Kornai, J.; Maskin, E. & Roland, G. (2003). “Understanding the soft budget constraint.” Journal of economic literature, 1095-1136.

Majone, G. (1997). “From the positive to the regulatory state: causes and consequences of changes
in the mode of governance.” Journal of Public Policy, 17(2), 139-167.

McCubbins, Mathew. “Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle”, en Handbook of New Institutional Economics, editado por Claude Ménard y Mary Shirley (2008) Editorial Srpinger.

McKelvey, Richard D. “Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control.” Journal of Economic theory 12, n.° 3 (1976): 472-482.

Meng, Xin; Nancy Qian and Pierre Yared. The institutional causes of China’s great famine, 1959-61. n.° w16361. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010.

Nort h, Douglass C. “Institutions and credible commitment.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (jite)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (1993): 11-23.

Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantc hekon. 2011. “The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa.” American Economic Review, 101(7): 3221-52.

Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Premchand, A. (1995). Effective government accounting. International Monetary Fund.

Riker, William H. and Steven J. Brams. “The paradox of vote trading.” The American Political Science Review (1973): 1.235-1.247.

Samuel, S.; Covaleski, M. A. & Dirsmith, M. W. (2008). “Accounting in and for us Governments and Non-profit Organizations: a Review of Research and a Call to Further Inquiry.” Handbooks of Management Accounting Research, 3, 1.299-1.322.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barr y R. Weingast. “Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice.” Public choice 37, n.° 3 (1981): 503-519.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barr y R. Weingast. “Uncovered sets and sophisticated voting outcomes with implications for agenda institutions.” American Journal of Political Science (1984): 49-74.

Tataru, Maria, and Vincent Merlin. “On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules.” Mathematical Social Sciences 34, n.° 1 (1997): 81-90.

Trujillo Alfaro, Jorge Luis (2007). Presupuesto. Una aproximación desde la Planeación y el Gasto Público, Editorial Universidad del Rosario.

Weingast, Barr y R. and William J. Marshall. “The industrial organization of Congress; or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets.” The Journal of Political Economy (1988): 132-163.

Williamson, Oliver E. “Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relations.” Journal of law and economics (1979): 233-261.

Young, Peyton. “Optimal Voting Rules.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, n.º 1 (1995): 51-64.


La descarga de datos todavía no está disponible.