Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
The Colombian National Development Plan and the Long Term
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La Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991 implementó herramientas de planeación económica para alcanzar el desarrollo económico en el largo plazo. Sin embargo, estableció que cada Gobierno debe implementar un Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Este escrito explica la interpretación legal de la expresión “largo plazo” en un contexto en que las herramientas regulatorias también son relevantes para alcanzar los objetivos del desarrollo económico.
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