Judges without Robes: A Republican Approach to Participatory Judicial Review
Judges without Robes: A Republican Approach to Participatory Judicial Review
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Este artículo presenta un enfoque republicano del control judicial de constitucionalidad de las leyes que se basa en una interpretación deliberativa y participativa de este arreglo institucional. El documento se divide en cinco secciones, más una introducción. La Sección I presenta algunas consideraciones y aclaraciones sobre el concepto de control judicial y el tipo de teoría política republicana que subyace a los principales argumentos del trabajo. La Sección II reconstruye la crítica republicana al control judicial. La Sección III muestra que suscribir una perspectiva republicana no necesariamente lleva a respaldar esta crítica y presenta una defensa del control judicial que se apoya en una concepción republicana de la democracia deliberativa que enfatiza el potencial de esta institución como un mecanismo que sirve para promover la participación política en igualdad de condiciones y que, por tanto, dota al control judicial de una legitimidad democrática participativa. La Sección IV argumenta que la legitimidad democrática participativa del control judicial debe ser vista como un fenómeno gradual cuya fuerza o debilidad relativa depende de las variaciones de las características específicas del contexto institucional donde opera el poder judicial. La Sección V presenta algunas conclusiones.
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