Proceso de aprendizaje de grupos terroristas: análisis a partir de una lectura estratégica
Terrorist Groups Learning Process: Analysis Through a Strategic Reading
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Conocer cómo los grupos terroristas adquieren, retienen, aplican y distribuyen conocimiento es un factor esencial para la aplicación de políticas públicas en seguridad. En el presente artículo se abordarán los procesos de aprendizaje de grupos terroristas e insurgentes a través de la discusión teórica de exponentes de los estudios de seguridad, a fin de ser comparados para ofrecer un marco que pueda satisfacer la realidad estratégica de varios de estos grupos. De igual forma, se realiza un estudio comparado de diferentes teatros de operaciones para evidenciar las características de las curvas de aprendizaje de grupos terroristas desde Daesh, hasta ETA y el IRA. El esfuerzo académico consignado en el presente artículo puede dar luces sobre cómo negar ventajas estratégicas a grupos terroristas e insurgentes mediante la aplicación de políticas públicas que tengan en cuenta tanto sus procesos de aprendizaje como su espectro estratégico.
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