¿Quién juzga? Una aproximación al diseño de los tribunales de decisión constitucional en Suramérica
Who Judges? Designing Courts of Constitutional Decision Making in South America
Barra lateral del artículo
PDF
FLIP
HTML
XML
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.
Contenido principal del artículo
Resumen
Uno de los rasgos característicos de los estados democráticos modernos es el control de constitucionalidad normativo. El ejercicio adecuado de la función por parte de los tribunales especializados es esencial para el aseguramiento de la primacía constitucional. Para ello, niveles adecuados de independencia y responsabilidad ante los auditorios resultan imperativos. El artículo detalla la arquitectura institucional de los tribunales de decisión constitucional en Suramérica a partir de métodos de derecho comparado según múltiples variables. Con base en este contraste se sugieren lineamientos generales para el diseño y reforma de estos con el fin de lograr grados óptimos.
Palabras clave:
Descargas
Detalles del artículo
Referencias (VER)
Bonilla Maldonado, D. (ed.), Constitutionalism of the Global South. The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Cappelletti, M. Judicial Review in the Contemporary World. Indianapolis: The Bobbs Merrill Company, 1971, 1-15.
Castillo-Ortiz, P. “The Dilemmas of Constitutional Courts and the Case for a New Design of Kelsenian Institutions”. En Law and Philosophy - An International Journal for Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy, 39, 2020, 617-655.
Dupré, C. “The Importation of Law: A New Comparative Perspective and the Hungarian Constitutional Court”. En Comparative Law in the 21st Century. London: Kluwer, 2002, 267-269.
Elster, J. “Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process”. En Duke Law Journal, 45, 1995, 364-376.
Elster, J. Ulises y las Sirenas: Estudios sobre racionalidad e irracionalidad. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2014.
Elster, J. Ulysses Unbound. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Epstein, L., Knight, J. and Shvetsova, O. “The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government”. En Law & Society Review, 35: 1, 2001, 117-164.
Esquirol, J. “Fictions of Latin American Law (Part I)”. En Utah Law Review, 425, 1997, 427-428.
Ferreres, V., “The European Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation: Toward Decentralization?”, en International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2: 3, 2004, 461-491.
Frankenberg, G. Comparative Constitutional Studies – Between Magic and Deceit. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018.
Frankenberg, G. Comparative Law as Critique. Elgar Studies in Legal Theory, Northhampton, 2016.
García Jaramillo, “‘Activismo judicial’: un viejo concepto para nuevos desafíos. Bogotá: Ámbito Jurídico, 2019, disponible en https://www.ambitojuridico.com/noticias/etcetera/constitucional-y-derechos-humanos/activismo-judicial-un-viejo-concepto-para
Gargarella, R. “Diez puntos sobre el cambio constitucional en Chile”, Revista Nueva Sociedad, 285, 2020, 12-22.
Gargarella, R. La Sala de Máquinas de la Constitución: dos siglos de constitucionalismo en América Latina (1810-2010). Madrid: Katz Editores, 2014.
Garoupa, N. “Empirical Legal Studies and Constitutional Courts”. En Indian Journal of onstitutional Law, 4: 3, 2010, 26-54.
Garoupa, N. and Ginsburg, T. Judicial Reputation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015.
Ginsburg, T, and Garoupa, N. “Building Reputation in Constitutional Courts: Political and Judicial Audiences”. En Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 28, 2011), 539-568.
Ginsburg, T. “Constitutional Courts in East Asia: Understanding Variation”. En Journal of Comparative Law, 3, 2008, 80-99.
Ginsburg, T. Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 22-35.
Harding A., Leyland, P. and Groppi, T. “Constitutional Courts: Forms, Functions and Practice in Comparative Perspective”. En Harding, A and Leyland P. (eds.). Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study. London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing, 2009.
Hirschl, R. Comparative Matters. The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Hirschl, R. Towards Juristocracy, The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.
Huntington, S. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Press, 1993.
Kage, R. Who Jugdes? Designing Jury Systems in Japan, East Asia, and Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Kelsen, H. “La garantía jurisdiccional de la Constitución”. En Anuario Iberoamericano de Justicia Constitucional, 15, 2011, 249-300.
Law, D. “Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights”. En Northwestern University Law Review, 102, 2008, 1277-1249.
Majone, G. “Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance”. En European Union Politics, 2: 1, 2001, 103-222.
Mangabeira Unger, R. What Should Legal Analysis Become? London: Verso, 1996.
Marie Slaughter, A. A New World Order. Princeton University Press, 2004.
Navarrete, R.M. and Castillo-Ortiz, P. “Constitutional courts and citizens” perceptions of judicial systems in Europe”. En Comparative European Politics, 18, 2020, 128-150.
Navia, P. y Ríos-Figueroa, J. “The Constitutional Adjudication Mosaic of Latin America”. En Comparative Political Studies, 38: 2, 2005, 189-217.
Neves, M. La constitucionalización simbólica. Lima: Palestra, 2015.
Nino, C. Introducción al Análisis del Derecho. Buenos Aires: Editorial Astrea, 2003, 11.
Romero, M.; Arrocha, M.; y Coria, V. Compendio de Estándares Internacionales para la Protección de la Independencia Judicial. San José: Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional, 2019.
Stone Sweet, A. “Constitutional Courts”. En The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 816-830.
Stone Sweet, A. “Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy”. En Thatcher and Sweet (eds.). West European Politics, 77-100.
Stone Sweet, A. Governing with Judges, Constitutional Politics in Europe. Oxford: Oxford, 2000.
Stone Sweet, A. “The politics of constitutional review in France and Europe”. En International Journal of Constitutional Law, 5: 1, 2007, 69-92.
Thatcher, M. and Stone Sweet, A. “Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions”. En The Politics of Delegation: Non-Majoritarian Institutions in Europe, West European Politics, 25: 1, 2002, 1-22.
Tushnet, M. “The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law”. En Virginia Journal of International Law, 49:4 2009, 985-1006.
Versteeg, M. and Ginsburg, T. “Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?” En The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 30: 3, 2013.
Voigt, S. “Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey”, en Public Choice, Constitutional Political Economy, 90 1997, 11-13.
Von Bogdandy, A.; Ferrer, E.; Morales, M.; Piovesan, F. (eds.). “Ius constitutionale commune en América Latina: A Regional Approach to Transformative Constitutionalism”. En Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America. The Emergence of a New Ius Commune. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Weinrib, L. “The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism”. En The Migration of Constitutional Ideas. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 83-113.
Citado por
