Subastas: diseño y estrategia
Auctions: Design and Strategy
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Este trabajo examina los elementos a considerar en las subastas, más allá del análisis de la conducta racional y estratégica, la búsqueda de eficiencia y la obtención de mejores precios para el subastador. Se analizan aspectos como la generación de expectativas de entrada, la financiación, el diseño de contratos y los mecanismos de gobernanza. En el caso de las subastas de contratación, se examinan aspectos de su diseño orientados a atraer la entrada de nuevos participantes, prevenir la colusión y evitar la concentración de mercado. Además, se estudian las condiciones que podrían propiciar el poder ex ante y ex post, su impacto, los posibles mecanismos de detección y prevención, y cómo estos se reflejan en los costos de cambio. Finalmente, se realiza una revisión bibliográfica que identifica los desarrollos recientes y las perspectivas de investigación en el área.
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