Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract

Values Matter: Patent Office, Innovation and the Social Contract

Contenido principal del artículo

Benedicto Acosta

Resumen

Según la teoría del contrato social de las patentes, los Estados otorgan una exclusividad comercial a los inventores a cambio de la divulgación de la tecnología, con el objetivo de facilitar futuras innovaciones. El argumento que defenderé es que, bajo la lógica de la teoría del contrato social, la falta de orientación por ciertos valores epistémicos puede contribuir a un escenario en el que la divulgación de invenciones no promueva la innovación tecnológica. Primero, explico cómo la visibilidad y accesibilidad de la información divulgada pueden verse afectadas por problemas en las bases de datos y los motores de búsqueda de patentes. Segundo, analizo cómo las oficinas de patentes pueden no estar fomentando la búsqueda ni la formación de los examinadores. Este estudio se basa principalmente en doce entrevistas en profundidad con examinadores de patentes españoles. La información analizada sugiere situaciones que pueden afectar la forma en que la tesis del contrato explica: (1) la difusión de la información y (2) los valores epistémicos que conducen a la innovación tecnológica.

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