El resurgimiento de la economía política en la ciencia política actual
The resurgence of political economy in today’s political science
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Este artículo describe el desarrollo histórico de las interpretaciones de la economía política, critica la pretensión hegemónica de la economía neoclásica y rescata la “nueva economía política”: el estudio de la constitución social, política y moral de la economía. Muestra como se la concibe en la ciencia política actual y ofrece dos claves de análisis para orientar futuras investigaciones. Por último hace un recorrido por trabajos recientes en América Latina que recogen esta interpretación, en especial las revisiones de la literatura sobre ‘economía política de la política económica’, y algunos estudios sobre las variedades del capitalismo.
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