La naturaleza de las instituciones. El debate actual
The nature of institutions. The current debate
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Guzmán, G. y Frasser, C. 2017. La naturaleza de las instituciones. El debate actual. Revista de Economía Institucional. 19, 37 (nov. 2017), 115–132. DOI:https://doi.org/10.18601/01245996.v19n37.06.
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En este artículo se discute la ontología de las instituciones y se critica la idea de que las instituciones están hechas únicamente de incentivos y acciones individuales. Se sostiene, además, que las instituciones no están constituidas únicamente por acciones de individuos, y que poseen una ontología propia, reglada y lingüística. Se comparan diversos enfoques sobre el tema y se presentan dos líneas de investigación sobresalientes en la literatura: el intento de construir una teoría unificada de las instituciones y una propuesta para incluir las reglas constitutivas en la teoría de juegos.
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Referencias (VER)
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Lawson, T. (2003). Reorienting economics. Londres: Routledge.
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Lucas, R. (1987). Models of business cycles. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Mäki, U. (2009). Realistic realism about unrealistic models. D. Ross y H. Kincaid (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of economics (pp. 68-98). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review, 83, 1281-1302.
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Rawls, J. (1955). Two concepts of rules. The Philosophical Review, 64, 3-32.
Searle, J. (1995). The construction of social reality. Nueva York: Simon & Schuster.
Searle, J. (2010). Making the social world. Nueva York: Oxford University Press.
Searle, J. (2016). The limits of emergence: Reply to Tony Lawson. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 46(4), 400-412.
Smit, J. et al. (2011). What is money? An alternative to Searle’s institutional facts. Economics and Philosophy, 27, 1-22.
Smit, J. et al. (2014). Developing the incentivized action view of institutional reality. Synthese, 191, 1813-1830.
Sugden, R. (2000). The motivating power of expectations. J. Nida-Rümelin y W. Spohn (eds.), Rationality, rules, and structure (pp. 103-125). Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Winch, P. (1958). The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy. Londres: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Wittgenstein, L. (1999). Investigaciones filosóficas. Barcelona: Altaya
Axelrod, R. y Hamilton, W. (1981). The Evolution of Cooperation. Science, 211(4489), 1390-1396.
Bicchieri, C. (2006). The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of social norms. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
Duarte, P. y Tadeu, G. (2012). Introduction. P. Duarte y G. Tadeu (eds.), Microfoundations reconsidered. The relationship of micro and macroeconomics in historical perspective (pp. 1-18). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Epstein, B. (2015). The ant trap. Rebuilding the foundations of the social sciences. Nueva York: Oxford University Press.
Fullbrook, E. (ed.). (2015). Ontology and economics. Tony Lawson and his critics. Londres: Routledge.
Gintis, H. (2009). The bounds of reason: Game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gintis, H. (2010). Social norms as choreography. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 9(3), 251-264.
Guala, F. (2005). Talking about structures: The ‘transcendental’ argument. Revue de philosophie économique, 12, 3-17.
Guala, F. (2007). The philosophy of social science: Metaphysical and empirical. Philosophy Compass, 2(6), 954-980.
Guralnik, G.; Hagen, C. et al. (1964). Global conservation laws and massless particles. Physical Review Letters, 13, 585.
Greif, A. y Kingston, C. (2011). Institutions: Rules or equilibria? N. Schofield y G. Caballero (eds.), Political economy of institutions, democracy and voting (pp. 13-44). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Hédoin, C. (2015). Accounting for constitutive rules in game theory. Journal of Economic Methodology, 22(4), 439-461.
Hindriks, F. y Guala, F. (2015). Institutions, rules and equilibria: A unified theory. Journal of Institutional Economics, 11(3), 459-480.
Hodgson, G. (2009). On the problem of formalism in economics. E. Fullbrook (ed.), Ontology and economics. Tony Lawson and his critics (pp. 175-188). Londres: Routledge.
Juselius, K. (2011). Time to reject the privileging of economic theory over empirical evidence? A reply to Lawson. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 35(2), 423-436.
Lawson, T. (1997). Economics and reality. Londres: Routledge.
Lawson, T. (2003). Reorienting economics. Londres: Routledge.
Lawson, T. (2014). Modelación matemática e ideología en la economía académica. Revista de Economía Institucional, 30, 25-51.
Lewis, D. (1969). Convention: A philosophical study. Malden: John Wiley and Sons.
Lucas, R. (1987). Models of business cycles. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Mäki, U. (2009). Realistic realism about unrealistic models. D. Ross y H. Kincaid (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of economics (pp. 68-98). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review, 83, 1281-1302.
Ramos, J. (2011). Two notions of normativity. Ponencia, París: Fondation Hugot-Collège de France.
Rawls, J. (1955). Two concepts of rules. The Philosophical Review, 64, 3-32.
Searle, J. (1995). The construction of social reality. Nueva York: Simon & Schuster.
Searle, J. (2010). Making the social world. Nueva York: Oxford University Press.
Searle, J. (2016). The limits of emergence: Reply to Tony Lawson. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 46(4), 400-412.
Smit, J. et al. (2011). What is money? An alternative to Searle’s institutional facts. Economics and Philosophy, 27, 1-22.
Smit, J. et al. (2014). Developing the incentivized action view of institutional reality. Synthese, 191, 1813-1830.
Sugden, R. (2000). The motivating power of expectations. J. Nida-Rümelin y W. Spohn (eds.), Rationality, rules, and structure (pp. 103-125). Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Winch, P. (1958). The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy. Londres: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Wittgenstein, L. (1999). Investigaciones filosóficas. Barcelona: Altaya
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