¿Instituciones del pueblo, por el pueblo y para el pueblo? Abordar el poder y la responsabilidad social de los bancos centrales en una democracia
The institutions of the people, by the people and for the people? Addressing central banks’ power and social responsibility in a democracy
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Este artículo da luz sobre un tema olvidado en economía: la responsabilidad social de los bancos centrales en una democracia. Consideramos que los bancos centrales son instituciones de poder y, como tales, ni ellos ni sus políticas son neutrales, pues hay ganadores y perdedores inevitables. Explicamos por qué y cómo la sociedad debe regular y controlar su poder. Nos centramos en el carácter distributivo del ingreso de la política monetaria para demostrar esta afirmación, y mostramos que ha llegado la hora de construir un nuevo marco de banca central que mejore la responsabilidad social de los bancos centrales conforme al espíritu de un sistema democrático, que se base en nuevas reglas, nuevos tipos de organización interna y una ética de la responsabilidad de nuevo tipo.
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