Regulación de plataformas: análisis crítico 2007-2022
Platform Regulation: Critical Analysis 2007-2022
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Resumen
La discusión sobre la regulación de plataformas se ha centrado, tanto en la academia, como en organismos internacionales y agencias de la competencia, en las herramientas del modelo neoclásico de regulación: cuotas de mercado y análisis de bienestar, entre otras. Más recientemente el big data y los algoritmos han pasado a ser centrales en estos debates. El objetivo de este artículo es analizar, desde una perspectiva crítica, la evolución de esta discusión, su impacto en las diferentes propuestas legislativas, y el largo período que llevó a la Unión Europea a adoptar, en 2022, la regulación de estas corporaciones. Adicionalmente, se sugieren nuevos instrumentos de políticas públicas que puedan superar estas nuevas normativas.
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