Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica
Default Rules in the Law: Toward a Theoretical Framework
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Las “reglas u opciones predeterminadas” son estructuras ubicuas en múltiples áreas del derecho. Aunque este tipo de reglas se han estudiado en el derecho de los contratos, más allá de este ámbito no han suscitado mayor interés en la doctrina jurídica de tradición civilista. Si bien esta doctrina ha sostenido reiteradamente que las reglas predeterminadas preservan per se un continuum en la libertad de decisión de sus destinatarios, este artículo refuta esta tesis y argumenta que estas reglas producen una profunda pero inadvertida afectación a la autonomía individual y la libertad de decisión individual. En esta perspectiva, el artículo reflexiona en torno a por qué en algunas áreas del derecho ciertos contenidos de las reglas predeterminadas pueden calificarse como éticamente inadmisibles. El artículo además sugiere algunos criterios preliminares para determinar “cómo” debiera diseñarse el contenido de las reglas predeterminadas.
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