Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
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La terminación anticipada es un mecanismo de compensación contractual implementado en proyectos de infraestructura de app, donde los inversionistas privados tienen derecho a abandonar el proyecto para mitigar riesgos como el de demanda. En este artículo utilizamos la teoría de opciones reales para valorar la terminación anticipada como una opción de abandono de un proyecto, en el que el riesgo de demanda y la tarifa de compensación se modelan asumiendo procesos estocásticos correlacionados. Así, se implementa el modelo de valoración de opciones con una solución analítica y se comparan los resultados con la técnica de simulación Monte Carlo. Los resultados confirman los beneficios que el mecanismo contractual ofrece a los inversionistas privados para mitigar riesgos y mejorar el valor del proyecto.
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